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  1The Effects of Concentration on Competition 
and Efficiency: Some Evidence 





This paper aims at investigating the effects of concentration on competition and cost efficiency of the 
French audit market. Competition is measured with the Rosse-Panzar model, while cost efficiency is 
estimated with stochastic frontier approach. Cost efficiency levels are estimated at around 75% with 
greater efficiency for Big-Four firms, while the nature of competition appears to be monopolistic 
competition. Dynamic analysis shows a reduction in competition, and a decrease in cost efficiency for 
Big-Four and non-Big-Four firms between 1999 and 2003. We therefore provide support to a negative 
impact of concentration on competition and cost efficiency. 
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  21. Introduction 
 
There is widespread evidence in favour of a high and increasing level of 
concentration on European audit markets (e.g. Buijink et al., 1998; Choi and Zéghal, 
1999; Pong, 1999; Beattie et al., 2003; Willekens and Achmadi, 2003). While 
concentration on audit markets has been widely investigated, analyses of the effects of 
concentration on competition, and especially on cost efficiency, remain scarce. 
Nonetheless, what matters in terms of consumers’ welfare is less concentration than 
competition and cost efficiency, as these both characteristics directly affect prices.  
Conventionally, following the structural theory of industrial organisation (Bain, 
1951), it is argued that concentration stands for a direct determinant of competition on 
the market. Rising concentration is expected to increase the likelihood of major firms’ 
anti-competitive behaviour, and should thus trigger off higher prices for clients. 
However, empirical studies on audit markets do not corroborate this assertion. They 
rather provide evidence of a positive effect of concentration on competition (e.g. 
Wootton et al., 1994; Ivancevich and Zardkoohi, 2000). Besides, it can be argued that 
high concentration implies cost efficiency through of economies of scale, economies 
of scope, the exit or the purchase of the least efficient firms… This phenomenon 
should in turn lead to a reduction in prices (Demsetz, 1973). Alternatively, reduced 
competition may allow firm managers to relax their efforts to control costs, which 
may limit the favourable implications of competition on prices (Hicks, 1935).  
This research assesses the effects of concentration on competition and cost 
efficiency by examining the structure of the French audit market. This market is very 
interesting to investigate given the specificities of the French auditing environment. 
First, firms publishing consolidated financial statements are required to select at least 
two auditors. This joint-auditing requirement may favour competition by allowing 
national audit firms to challenge international networks (Piot, 2007). Second, the 
auditors are appointed for a six-year commitment, which can be interpreted as an 
important barrier to entry. Third, the French audit market is characterised by an 
increasing merger activity among the main suppliers. This concentration is giving rise 
to concerns about reduced competition in the French audit market. A recent survey
1 
reveals that 86% of 65 CFOs, issued from large French firms, consider that the audit 
                                                           
1 Option Finance, n°877, 3/04/2006. 
  3market is too concentrated . Their major concerns lie on the risk of higher audit fees 
and dependence towards auditors. These concerns are all the more important as the 
wave of concentration is expected to increase in the upcoming years, as illustrated by 
the very recent mergers of KPMG and Deloitte with two major domestic firms 
(respectively RSM Salustro Reydel and BDO Marque & Gendrot). 
Our results should provide some keys on the possible consequences of such 
mergers on market structure characteristics. The key issue is to determine if the 
increasing concentration induces a reduction in competition and in cost efficiency. 
Such reduction would lead to an increase in the level of audit fees, and a deterioration 
of audited companies’ welfare. 
Our empirical tests are based on sophisticated measures assessing market 
structure characteristics. Competition in the market for accounting services is usually 
assessed with concentration ratios or Herfindahl indices (e.g. Minyard and Tabor, 
1991; Wootton et al., 1994). In our work, we measure competition with the Rosse-
Panzar model which takes into account the actual pricing behaviour of the firm, 
instead of using information on market structure. Cost efficiency is measured using 
the methodology of frontier efficiency techniques. Commonly applied in the banking 
industry or public utilities, these methods provide relative and synthetic measures of 
performance, the cost efficiency scores, which assess managerial performance to 
control costs.  
The investigation of competition and cost efficiency may offer new perspectives 
of research for the analysis of audit markets. Furthermore, our results may provide 
implications for the regulator to assess whether concentration should be promoted or 
not on the audit market. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
background and describes the French audit market. Section 3 presents the 
methodologies and variables chosen to test competition and cost efficiency. Section 4 
outlines the empirical results. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks in section 
5. 
 
  42. Prior literature 
 
2.1 Empirical literature 
 
  In an environment of growing merger activity among accounting firms, there 
has been a rising concern regarding the effect of increasing concentration on 
competition. It is commonly argued that rising levels of concentration result in an 
increase in market power, which can lead to anti-competitive behaviour and 
consequently to higher fees for clients. Several prior empirical studies examined the 
implications of rising concentration on competition. These works measure 
competition using concentration ratios, which report the share of a given metric of the 
largest suppliers (e.g. number of audits, clients’ revenue), and Herfindhal indices, or 
examine the changes in audit fees following the mergers.  
  In contrast to the common belief, US studies tend to support a positive link 
between concentration and competition. According to Minyard and Tabor (1991), 
Tonge and Wootton (1991) and Wootton et al. (1994), greater concentration does not 
necessarily lead to lower competition. They document that the 1989 megamergers 
induced greater competition among the major accounting firms. Moreover, Ivancevich 
and Zardkoohi (2000) provide evidence of a decrease in prices driven by mergers, 
both for the merged firms and their direct rivals. Pearson and Trompeter (1994) also 
find a negative relationship between concentration and audit fees, which is consistent 
with the view that higher concentration leads to greater price competition. 
  The findings are similar in Europe. Choi and Zéghal (1999) show evidence that 
in some European countries, the performance of large audit firms, based on revenue 
per employee, was superior to that of small firms in the pre-merger and post-merger 
period, which is consistent with a reduced competition. However the performance of 
large and small firms does not significantly differ in several other countries, which 
indicates that high levels of concentration do not necessarily spark off reduced 
competition. Examining the German and Dutch audit market structure between 1970 
and 1994, Buijink et al. (1998) also conclude that high levels of concentration do not 
indicate limited competition. In the UK, Iyer and Iyer (1996) find no evidence that the 
mergers set off a significant increase in audit fees. Similarly, Willekens and Achmadi 
(2003) show that price competition increased between 1989 and 1997 in Belgium, in a 
  5context of increasing concentration. To our knowledge, the only study supporting the 
market power hypothesis was drawn by Lee (2005). He observes that the 1989 
mergers in Hong Kong favoured an increase in audit fees for the merged accounting 
firms. 
To complete the debate on the relationship between concentration and market 
power, a few empirical studies chew over the efficiency consequences of 
concentration on the audit market. Many efficiency benefits are argued to come to 
light from mergers, as a result of economies of scale, economies of scope, the 
strategic use of complementary resources, the improvement in production 
techniques… Two studies examine the effects of the 1989 megamergers on the US 
audit market on cost performance (Ivancevich and Zardkoohi, 2000; Sullivan, 2002). 
Their results conjure up the positive impact of mergers on efficiency within the 
accounting market. Ivancevich and Zardkoohi (2000) provide evidence of an overall 
decline in audit price during the post-merger period, and a decrease in factor costs for 
the merged firms relative to their close rivals
2. Sullivan (2002) examines the 
outcomes of auctions for corporate audit clients who switched auditors. She finds out 
that merged firms were more successful in competing for large clients, suggesting a 
reduction in the costs of auditing these specific clients. Based on a more recent period 
(1995-1999), Banker et al. (2003) analyse the relationship between the total revenue 
of the top 100 accounting firms in the US and three human resources inputs (number 
of partners, number of other professionals and number of other employees). They 
stumble on an improvement in average productivity over the four years. 
 
2.2 The French audit market 
 
We observe high concentration in the French audit market, as in other European 
countries. Piot (2005) and Broye (2007) provide evidence that concentration ratios in 
France are equivalent to those observed in the UK or the US. The Big Four audit 
firms dominate the market with 85% of the audit fees of the CAC 40 firms
3 in 2003. 
                                                           
2 Measures of factor costs include: number of offices occupied by audit firms per billion dollars of assets 
audited, number of professional staff employed per billion dollars of assets audited, number of partners, and 
number of offices per 1000 professional staff. 
3 (Le Monde, February 25
th 2005). CAC 40 is the stock market index including 40 of the largest 
companies listed on the French stock markets. 
  6However the French audit market is also characterized by a group of large national 
networks, owning significant market shares among listed companies. 
The domination of the “Big” emerged in the 1980s, and strengthened during the 
last 20 years as the result of important merger activity. The mergers primarily took 
place among the “Big”. As we know, the Big Eight became the Big Six between 1987 
and 1989, and finally the Big Four emerged in 2002. The 1990s were also 
characterized by significant mergers between Big Four firms and large national 
networks (for example Price Waterhouse and Befec in 1989, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu and Calan Ramolino in 1997, KPMG and CCAS in 1997). 
A wave of mergers also occurred among the domestic second-tier firms (for 
example Mazars and Guerard Viala in 1995, Amyot and Exco in 1997, Amyot Exco 
and Fidulor in 2001 to form Grant Thornton, Fiducial and E3C in 2001). As a 
consequence, the number of main suppliers significantly reduced over this period of 
time, giving rise to concerns about reduced competition. 
According to Piot (2007), the joint-auditing requirement may preserve market 
competition in France. This author studied the joint-audit interconnections of the main 
audit networks over the period 1997-2003. He finds that increasing concentration did 
not result in abnormally frequent collaborations between the main audit firms. Our 
research proposes to investigate directly the effect of concentration on competition, 




3.1 Measurement of competition 
 
The usual measures of competition in the audit market are structural measures 
of concentration, i.e. concentration ratios or the Herfindahl index (e.g. Wootton et al., 
1994). The main limitation of these measures is their inference of the competition 
degree from indirect proxies such as market structure or market shares. They 
consequently ignore how accounting firms determine their price according to their 
underlying costs, and the potential competition on the market (i.e. potential new 
entries). Other studies resort to audit fees to measure competition, as lower audit fees 
are interpreted as evidence of greater competition (e.g. Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; 
  7Iyer and Iyer, 1996; Ivancevich and Zardkoohi, 2000; Lee, 2005). However in these 
studies, if audit fees are to inform on the evolution of competition, they can not 
provide information on the degree of competition as they are not relied to firm costs. 
This research proposes to measure competition by computing the Rosse-Panzar 
model (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987). This model has been 
widely applied in banking (e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Weill, 2004) but also in other 
industries (e.g. Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003). The Rosse-Panzar model is a non-
structural test, meaning that it assesses the competitive behaviour of firms without 
using information on market structure. Furthermore, it does not require information 
on output prices, which is particularly interesting to study the audit industry where 
output prices are a thorny case of evaluation. 
This test is based upon the estimation of the H-statistic, which aggregates the 
elasticities of total revenues with respect to the input prices. This statistic indicates the 
extent to which the firms pass a variation in input prices on their fees. In a perfect 
competition environment, any change in input prices is expected to be entirely passed 
on fees. The H-statistic then determines the nature of the market structure as 
following: 
H ≤ 0    Monopoly 
0 < H < 1  Monopolistic competition 
H = 1    Perfect competition 
 
  The major advantage of such a test, in comparison to structural measures of 
competition such as the concentration ratio C5 or the Herfindahl index, is that it 
weighs up the actual pricing behaviour of the accounting firm by including 
contestability. Contestability supposes that firms’ behaviour is not only related to 
market structure, but also to the barriers to entry influencing the likelihood of new 
competitors’ entry, and therefore the behaviour of incumbents who are forecasting 
such an entry (Baumol et al., 1982). As observed by Claessens and Laeven (2004) in 
banking, the actual behaviour of a firm is not only related to market structure, but also 
to the barriers to entry. These barriers, influencing the likelihood of new competitors’ 
entry, naturally affect the behaviour of incumbents forecasting such an entry. 
Our aim is to provide a measure of competition for each year to assess the 
evolution of competition in the French audit market. Therefore, we need to run 
  8separately the Rosse-Panzar model for each year. We then estimate the following 
equation for the measurement of Rosse-Panzar statistic : 
ln TURNOVER   =  α0 + α1 ln pL +α2 ln pK + α3 ln ASSETS + ε   (1) 
where TURNOVER  represents total turnover, pL price of labour, pK price of 
physical capital, and ASSETS total assets. This last variable takes differences in size 
into account, as applied in Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Weill (2004). As it aggregates 
the elasticities of total revenues to input prices, the H-statistic is defined as the sum of 
the coefficients α1 and α2. 
 
3.2 Measurement of efficiency 
 
Cost efficiency is measured using the methodology of frontier efficiency 
techniques. These methods provide sophisticated measures of performance - the cost 
efficiency scores - which assess managerial performance to control costs. These 
measures present two major advantages in comparison with traditional performance 
indicators used in the accounting literature, such as measures of single factor 
productivity (Ivancevich and Zardkoohi, 2000), or profitability indicators (Choi and 
Zéghal, 1999). First, frontier efficiency techniques provide synthetic measures of 
performance. Indeed, unlike basic productivity ratios which report one input at a time, 
efficiency scores allow to include several input dimensions in the evaluation of 
performance. Second, efficiency scores are relative measures of performance. 
Namely, a cost frontier is estimated to enable the comparison of each firm to the best-
practice firms. It then directly provides a relative measure of performance. 
Graph 1 provides an illustration of the frontier efficiency methodology. A cost 
frontier is estimated, providing a benchmark for each firm for a given output. This is 
the “best practice” frontier allowing comparisons among the firms within the industry. 
TThe measure of cost efficiency indicates how close to the optimal cost that should 
have been supported for producing the same bundle of outputs a firm’s cost is. It then 
provides information on wastes in the production process and on the optimality of the 
chosen mix of inputs. The efficiency score is computed by comparing the optimal cost 
with the observed cost. 
 
INSERT GRAPH 1 HERE 
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Several techniques exist to estimate the cost frontier. We use the stochastic 
frontier approach (SFA) to estimate the cost efficiency scores (Aigner et al., 1977). 
This approach is frequently applied in banking (Berger and Humphrey, 1997), but 
also in other industries such as public services or airlines. The basic model assumes 
that the total cost of the firm is a function of its output and the input prices. Total cost 
deviates from the optimal cost by a random disturbance, v, and an inefficiency term, 
u. Thus the cost function is TC =  f(Y, P) + ε  where TC represents total cost, Y is the 
vector of outputs, P the vector of input prices and ε the error term which is the sum of 
u and v. u is a one-sided component representing cost inefficiencies, meaning the 
degree of weakness of managerial performance. v is a two-sided component 
representing random disturbances, reflecting luck or measurement errors. u and v are 
independently distributed. v is assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean 
and variance σ². Several distributions have been proposed in the literature for the 
inefficiency component u: half-normal, truncated normal, gamma, exponential. We 
assume a gamma distribution for inefficiency terms following Greene (1990)
4. 
We estimate yearly frontiers rather than one common frontier for the complete 
period to allow the coefficients of the cost frontier to vary over time. We estimate a 
system of equations composed of a translog cost function and its associated input cost 
share equations, derived using Shepard’s lemma.
5 Estimation of this system adds 
degrees of freedom and results in more efficient estimates than the mere single-
equation cost function. Since the share equations sum to unity, we solve the problem 
of singularity of the disturbance covariance matrix of the share equations by omitting 
one input cost share equation from the estimated system of equations. Standard 
symmetry constraints and homogeneity conditions are imposed. Thus, the complete 
model is the following: 
                                                           
4 According to Jondrow et al. (1982), firm-specific estimates of inefficiency terms can be calculated by using the 
distribution of the inefficiency term conditional to the estimate of the composite error term. Greene (1990) has then 
provided the estimate of the cost inefficiency term with a gamma distribution.
 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
for further details on stochastic frontier approach. 
5 Previous studies estimating production and cost functions for accounting firms also adopt a translog 
form (Cheng et al., 2000b, to estimate economies of scale and scope, and Banker et al., 2003, to 
estimate a production function and a production frontier). 
  10 ln  TC =  α0 + α1 ln y + α2 (ln y)² + β1 ln pK + β2 ln pL + ½ δ1 (ln pK)²   (2) 
     +  ½  δ2 (ln pL)² + δ3 (ln pL) (ln pK) +γ1 (ln y) (ln pK) + γ2 (ln y) (ln pL) 
     +  ε 
  S = d ln TC / d ln pL = β2 + δ2 ln pL + δ3 ln pK + γ2 ln y + η      (3) 
 
where  TC represents total cost, y turnover, pL price of labour, pK price of 
physical capital, S labour cost share
6,  η error term (η independent from ε). The 
system of equations is estimated using Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(ITSUR) estimation technique.  
To our knowledge, SFA has only been applied once in the market for 
accounting services by Banker et al. (2003). However this research is allusive 
regarding the application of efficiency frontiers, as it focuses on the estimation of a 
production function and only mentions the use of this technique. An alternative 
technique, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), has been proposed by Cheng et al. 
(2000a) to evaluate Taiwanese accounting firms’ technical efficiency in 1994. While 
SFA is based on econometric techniques, DEA uses linear programming tools to 
estimate efficiency scores. We prefer applying SFA in this work to compute 
efficiency scores rather than DEA. Indeed DEA considers the whole distance from the 
frontier as inefficiency, resulting in a possible overestimation of inefficiencies and a 
high sensitivity of efficiency scores to outliers. In comparison, SFA presents the 
major advantage of disentangling the distance from the frontier between efficiency 
and a statistical noise taking exogenous events into account in the error term, avoiding 
the drawbacks of DEA. 
 
                                                           
6 S is equal to the personnel expenses divided by total cost. 
  113.3 Data and variables 
 
Data for accounting firms were gathered from the "Diane" database edited by 
Bureau Van Dijk, which contains financial information for more than 400 000 firms. 
We limit our analysis to the largest accounting firms, i.e. with revenues greater than 4 
millions of euros
7. We then use an unbalanced panel during the period 1999-2003
8. 
This period was marked by the emergence of the Big Four group, with the merger 
between Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse in July 1998 and the collapse of 
Arthur Andersen in 2002. A key issue is the extent to which these events have 
resulted in important changes in competition and cost efficiency. 
As a measure of output, we use total turnover to compute the cost frontier. The 
inputs, whose prices are used to estimate the cost efficiency frontier and the Rosse-
Panzar statistic, include labour and physical capital. The price of labour is measured 
by the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees. The price of physical 
capital is defined as the ratio of depreciation to fixed assets. Total costs requested in 
the cost frontier are the sum of personnel expenses, measuring labour costs, and 
depreciation, measuring physical capital costs. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample. We observe that mean 
turnover augmented between 1999 and 2003, which is in accordance with increased 
concentration for the period of study. Mean price of labour considerably soared 
between 1999 and 2003 (+32.86%). This result might also be explained by an 
increased concentration if we suppose that larger firms, characterised by higher price 
of labour, absorbed smaller accounting firms. Mean price of physical capital remained 
relatively constant between 1999 and 2003. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
                                                           
7 Accounting firms are all firms characterised by the NAF Industry Code 741C, i.e. “Accounting and 
bookkeeping activities”. 
8 We choose an unbalanced panel rather than a balanced panel, to take firms gone into bankrupt or 
those being absorbed into account. Indeed the use of a balanced panel may overestimate cost efficiency 
as it ignores these firms, which may be less efficient on average. 
  124. Results 
 
4.1. The estimation of competition 
 
The estimation results of the Rosse-Panzar model for each year are reported in 
table 2. Based upon the value of the adjusted R² statistic, the fit of the equations is 
very satisfactory. The results on the competition measure, the H-statistic, are 
displayed for each year in table 3. Several conclusions come to the front. 
First, the values of the H-statistic are included between 0 and 1 for all years, 
meaning a monopolistic competition structure on the French audit market. This result 
is hard to weigh against former empirical studies in other countries, as these studies 
only provide structural information on concentration, or else give figures on audit 
fees, without relying fees to marginal costs. 
Second, the H-statistic regularly decreased from 0.4618 in 1999 to 0.0365 in 
2003. Following Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Claessens and Laeven (2004), we 
consider the H-statistic as a continuous measure of competition. Therefore, our 
findings suggest a considerable reduction of competition during the period of study. 
These results should be linked with the observation of a high concentration still 
increasing on the French audit market. Indeed the computation of the Herfindahl 
index and the C4 index of concentration on our sample respectively show an increase 
of concentration from 5.05% to 5.46% and from 35.68% to 39.10% between 1999 and 
2003. Therefore our findings support the intuitive view that higher concentration is 
associated with lower competition. They contrast with those of previous studies, 
which conclude to a positive relationship between concentration and competition. 
Besides, these results indicate that the joint-auditing requirement does not seem to 
preserve competition in a context of increasing concentration. 
Nevertheless, our results are so far not sufficient to assess the impact of 
concentration on consumer welfare. Namely, while accounting firms may have 
increased their market power through the recent mergers, clients may have not 
undergone an increase in prices. This would be the case if mergers had contributed to 
decrease costs so that this cost reduction offsets the increase in margins resulting from 
a higher market power. We therefore turn to the estimation of cost efficiency to 
complete the analysis. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
4.2. The estimation of efficiency 
 
We now turn to the results regarding the efficiency scores. The ITSUR 
estimation of the cost function system for each year is displayed in table 4. Based on 
the individual t-statistics and the value of the adjusted R² on the OLS equation, the fit 
of the equations is satisfactory for all yearly estimations. The mean efficiency scores 
by year and by group of accounting firms are presented in table 5. Indeed we deemed 
the existence of significant differences in cost efficiency between Big-Four and non-
Big-Four firms worth of analysis. 
First, we compute the level of cost inefficiencies of French accounting firms. 
Our analysis shows yearly mean efficiency levels ranging from 73.52% to 78.44%. 
This shows that accounting firms produce approximately three quarters of the optimal 
production they could produce with the same level of costs. This result is rather 
similar to the level of inefficiencies observed in other industries, such as banking 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The only work providing efficiency scores of 
accounting firms exhibits a mean efficiency score of 72.2% for Taiwanese accounting 
firms in 1994, meaning a similar order of magnitude (Cheng et al., 2000a). 
Second, we investigate the evolution of cost efficiency between 1999 and 2003. 
Indeed, one may wonder how cost efficiency was affected by increased concentration 
and reduced competition. There is a commonly accepted view that competition 
favours efficiency. This intuitive idea was theoretically justified by Hicks (1935) 
considering that monopoly power allows to relax efforts. This “quiet life” assumption 
hints at the idea that monopoly power allows managers to grab a share of the 
monopoly rents through discretionary expenses or a reduction of their effort. However 
Demsetz (1973) suggested a positive relationship between concentration and cost 
efficiency, as the most efficient firms benefit from lower costs and therefore higher 
market shares, which leads to a higher level of concentration. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
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Our results show a reduction in cost efficiency of 4.92 points between 1999 and 
2003. This evolution is regular along the period, with the exception of a slight 
increase between 2000 and 2001. When confronted with the reduction of competition 
during the same period, this result tends to support the view that lower competition 
has hampered cost efficiency of French accounting firms, in accordance with the 
intuitive positive link between competition and cost efficiency. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Third, we compare cost efficiency of Big-Four firms and non-Big-Four firms 
over time. This is an issue of considerable interest, chiefly to get information on the 
better ability of the leading accounting firms to control costs. Besides, as Big-Four 
firms have been outstandingly concerned by the recent mergers, we are interested to 
know whether Big-Four firms have undergone a different evolution in terms of cost 
efficiency than non-Big-Four firms.  
  The static analysis shows that Big-Four firms are more cost efficient than non-
Big-Four firms, supporting the view of a better ability of Big-Four firms to control 
costs. However we have performed a t-test to assess the significance of the difference 
between mean efficiency scores of each group of firms. This test showed that the 
advantage in cost efficiency for Big-Four firms is not significant for each year of the 
study, if we except 2000 where this advantage is significant at the 10% level. 
In terms of evolution of cost efficiency, we point out that both groups of 
accounting firms suffered from a reduction in cost efficiency between 1999 and 2003, 
with a slightly greater fall for Big-Four firms (-4.99 points) than for non-Big-Four 
firms (-4.87 points). The parallel reduction in cost efficiency for both groups of 
accounting firms is a major result. It props up the view that increased concentration, 
which has particularly affected Big-Four firms, has an overall negative impact on cost 
efficiency.  
As a consequence, our results suggest that increased concentration and reduced 
competition hamper cost efficiency for French accounting firms. First, we provide 
evidence of significant cost inefficiencies which may be put into parallel with the 
degree of competition observed above. Second, cost efficiency decreased between 
1999 and 2003 at the same pace than competition. Third, Big-Four firms, despite their 
  15better ability to control costs, also suffered from a reduction in cost efficiency. 
Therefore, we support the view that increased concentration hampers cost efficiency 
in accordance with the “quiet life” hypothesis provided by Hicks (1935). This is a 
major finding for the normative implications of concentration on the audit market. 
Indeed the awkward effects of concentration on cost efficiency are in favour of a 
restrictive regulatory policy of mergers between accounting firms. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This research has provided new evidence on competition and cost performance 
of accounting firms by introducing refined methodologies in this industry, with an 
application on the French audit market over a period of rising concentration. 
We have performed a non-structural test of competition, the Rosse-Panzar 
model, which provided evidence of monopolistic competition on this market and of 
reduced competition between 1999 and 2003. Stochastic frontier approach was also 
applied to estimate cost efficiency of accounting firms. We show that cost efficiency 
lies around 75%, supporting the view of significant potential gains in reduction of 
costs in the French accounting industry. We furthermore observe a reduction in cost 
efficiency between 1999 and 2003 for Big-Four and non-Big-Four firms. 
All these results tend to convey the idea that increased concentration has been 
associated with lower competition and lower cost efficiency through the period of this 
study. As we consequently suggest that greater concentration triggers off a social loss, 
the normative implications of this work are rather in favour of a limitation of 
concentration on the French audit market. Our results should however be considered 
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  18Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables 
This table presents the mean values for each item by year. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
Turnover, total assets and total cost are in thousand euros. 
 
  N  Output    Input prices    Other characteristics 




  Total assets  Total cost  Number of 
employees 
1999  117  17,435    54.29  0.0544    13,855 10,352 190.82 
   (45,178)    (24.44)  (0.0454)   (27,609) (30251) (534.90) 
2000  119  19,018    55.66  0.0534    15,683 10,996 197.08 
   (49,657)    (28.61)  (0.0431)   (33,033) (32,301) (547.27) 
2001  125  21,101    55.49  0.0614    17,097 11,893 207.38 
   (56,573)    (27.75)  (0.0839)   (34,891) (35,146) (570.47) 
2002  127  22,364    59.20  0.0511    18,268 12,491 217.06 
   (59,061)    (35.78)  (0.0443)   (39,690) (36,967) (609.97) 
2003  143  23,388    72.13  0.0533    18,957 12,471 197.91 
   (62,374)    (65.46)  (0.0493)   (41,099) (36,772) (580.16) 
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Table 2: Estimation of the Rosse-Panzar model by year 
ln TURNOVER  = α0 + α1 ln pL +α2 ln pK + α3 ln ASSETS + ε  
TURNOVER =  total turnover ; pL = price of labour ; pK = price of physical capital ; ASSETS = total 
assets. 
 
 Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
1999  Intercept 0.1980  0.31 
  Price of labour  0.3403**  2.32 
  Price of physical capital  0.1215***  6.50 
  Assets 0.8852***  20.15 
  Adjusted R²  0.7867   
2000  Intercept 0.3539  0.56 
  Price of labour  0.2385  1.60 
  Price of physical capital  0.1034***  4.57 
  Assets 0.9004***  19.32 
  Adjusted R²  0.7720   
2001  Intercept 0.4140  0.75 
  Price of labour  0.2433*  1.88 
  Price of physical capital  0.1346***  6.23 
 Assets  0.9039***  22.27 
 Adjusted  R²  0.8174   
2002  Intercept 0.7863  1.55 
  Price of labour  0.0994  0.88 
  Price of physical capital  0.1355***  6.30 
  Assets 0.9290***  22.24 
  Adjusted R²  0.8085   
2003  Intercept 0.9474***  2.64 
  Price of labour  0.0090  0.13 
  Price of physical capital  0.0276*  1.71 
  Assets 0.9139***  26.49 
 Adjusted  R²  0.8568   
*, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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Table 3: H-statistic by year 
H-statistic is obtained with the Rosse-Panzar model. It aggregates the elasticities of total revenues with 
respect to the input prices. 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  Evolution
N  117 119 125 127 143   
H-statistic  0.4618 0.3418 0.3780 0.2349 0.0365 -0.4253 
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Table 4: ITSUR estimation of cost function system by year 
ln TC =  α0 + α1 ln y + α2 (ln y)² + β1 ln pK + β2 ln pL + ½ δ1 (ln pK)²  
   +  ½  δ2 (ln pL)² + δ3 (ln pL) (ln pK) +γ1 (ln y) (ln pK) + γ2 (ln y) (ln pL) + ε 
TC = total cost ; y = turnover ; pL = price of labour ; pK = price of physical capital. 
 
Parameter 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Intercept -4.626**  -2.972  -3.805*  -4.098*  -6.707* 
ln y   1.177***   0.853*   1.057**   1.080**   1.605** 
(ln y)² -0.028    0.002  -0.021  -0.020  -0.074 
ln pL  0.931***   0.905***   0.916***   0.941***   0.968*** 
(ln pL)²   0.003***   0.003***   0.004***   0.004***   0.005*** 
ln pK  0.069***   0.095***   0.084***   0.059***   0.032* 
(ln pK)²   0.003***   0.003***   0.004***   0.004***   0.005*** 
(ln pL) (ln pK) -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.005*** 
(ln y) (ln pL)   0.002   0.004**   0.002  -0.365
E-3 -0.004* 
(ln y) (ln pK) -0.002  -0.004**  -0.002    0.365
E-3   0.004* 
Adjusted R² on OLS 
equation 
 0.8175   0.7954   0.7751   0.7528   0.6461 
Function converged at 
iteration 
8 11  7  8 6 
 *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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Table 5: Mean efficiency scores by year 
Cost efficiency scores are obtained with stochastic frontier approach. Cost efficiency measures how 
close a bank’s cost is to what a best-practice bank’s cost would be for producing the same bundle of 
outputs. 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  Evolution 







































All scores are in percentage. Standard deviation is in brackets. 
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Graph 1: The efficiency frontier 
 
      Observed  cost 










               Qi                 Q 
Q represents the output, COST the total cost 
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